The Unfair Trade Practice of Hiring Illegal Alien Workers by Marshall, Kevin S.
  
 
49 
 
THE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE OF HIRING 
ILLEGAL ALIEN WORKERS 
Kevin S. Marshall* 
Businesses or employers that knowingly hire illegal aliens are 
violating the law, but who is there to enforce such laws?  The 
federal government is overwhelmed.  In the case of those 
businesses that gain an unfair advantage by hiring illegal aliens 
for below-market wages, often without paying taxes, perhaps it is 
time we gave their direct competitors the ability to sue for unfair 
competition.  This would allow those businesses put at a 
competitive disadvantage to punish the cheaters.  These very 
competitors justly complain the loudest to me about illegal 
immigration.  The law-abiding businesses of Virginia are at a 
disadvantage when competing with businesses defying our laws 
by hiring illegal aliens. 
 
 - Virginia State Senator Ken Cuccinelli1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The issue of whether hiring illegal workers constitutes an unfair 
method of competition is presently emerging from an embryonic stage of 
hypothetical consideration to a potentially viable jurisprudential issue.2  
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economics from Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois in 1982, a J.D. from Emory 
University School of Law in 1985, a Masters in Public Affairs from the University 
of Texas at Dallas in 1991, and a Ph.D. in political economy from the University of 
Texas at Dallas in 1993.  Professor Marshall teaches courses in antitrust, law and 
economics, remedies, and contracts at the University’s College of Law, as well as 
graduate courses in economics and finance at the University of La Verne College 
of Business and Public Management.  This article received the Pacific Southwest 
Academy of Legal Studies in Business’ 2008 Double-Blind Peer-Reviewed Best 
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 1. Ken Cuccinelli (Va. State Senator for the 37th District of Va.), What Should 
Virginia Do About Illegal Immigrants? RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 2005, at F1. 
 2. See Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Complaint and Defendant’s 
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Although identified, acknowledged and even advocated within the current 
debate regarding immigration reform,3 the issue has been essentially 
ignored within the jurisprudential landscape of domestic competition law.  
This article addresses the viability of an unfair competition claim grounded 
on the act of hiring illegal workers from an economic perspective. 
This article’s analysis proceeds in five parts.  Part I serves as an 
overview.  Part II introduces and descriptively analyzes the 
jurisprudential/economic issue in question, as well as chronicles recently 
filed inter-competitor lawsuits seeking relief from the illegal hiring 
practices of a horizontal competitor.  Part II also demonstrates that the 
issues addressed herein are timely and relevant with respect to the current 
socio-economic debate regarding U.S. immigration policy. 
Part III reviews the economic objectives of the antitrust laws, and 
supplements and bolsters the reader’s understanding of the interdisciplinary 
relationship between law and economics within the context of antitrust law 
and the regulation of competition.  In this regard, Part III introduces and 
explains the fundamental microeconomic constructs that drive the 
efficiencies of the perfectly-competitive model.  Part III further argues that 
a robust understanding of the fundamental economic tenets of the perfectly-
competitive economic model is a necessary predicate to understanding 
actionable anticompetitive behavior.  More importantly, Part III describes 
Counterclaims, at 27, Seven Lives, Inc. v. Regal Baking Co., No. CV 00-08851 CBM (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Answer], wherein defendant competitor alleges that 
“[u]pon information and belief Counter-Defendants employ a substantial number of illegal 
aliens in its business operations, probably the majority of their employees, which gives the 
Counter-Defendants an unfair business advantage over legitimate competitors like Counter-
Plaintiff.”; see also Complaint at 7, Global Horizons, Inc. v. Munger Bros., LLC, No. S-
1500-CV 258904 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2006), wherein the plaintiff, Global Horizons, 
Inc., alleges that the Defendants “conspired to restrain trade or commerce and lessen 
competition by Defendants’ use of illegal immigrant labor and violation of California wage 
and hour laws to those workers, the effect of which restrains and directly affects Plaintiff’s 
ability to compete in the marketplace.”  Global Horizons further alleges that the Defendants 
“illegally conspired to have illegal immigrant undocumented workers used as cheap farm 
labor on defendant MUNGER’S commercial farm from April thru June 2006.”  Id. at 8.  
The Complaint also states that “[i]f Defendant’s prohibited combination is allowed to 
continue unabated . . . [c]ompetition in the field of commercial farm labor in Kern County 
will be eliminated or substantially lessened.”  Id. at 9. 
 3. See Cuccinelli, supra note 1, at F1 (advocating for the right to sue businesses that 
hire illegal immigrants); see also, e.g., Sylvia R. Lazos, The Professor's Corner:  In the 
Most Important Immigration Case in Recent History, the U.S. Government and 
Undocumented Workers Lose, NEVADA LAWYER (June 2003), available at 
http://www.nvbar.org/publications/NevadaLawyer/2003/June2003/ 
ImmigrationLaw.htm (“Unlike other business rules, benefiting from hiring undocumented 
labor is not per se illegal.  In the law of unfair competition, for example, the very act of 
price fixing is illegal and actionable under law.  The same goes for polluting.  In 
immigration law, employers are not held to any legal consequence if they are found to be 
employing undocumented workers.”). 
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and illustrates the analytical relevance of the perfectly-competitive model’s 
conditions of (a) profit maximization and (b) zero, long-run economic 
profits, both of which provide significant insight with respect to the task of 
identifying predatory conduct. 
Part IV, applying the microeconomic constructs discussed in Part III, 
analyzes the economics of hiring illegal alien workers at below-market 
wages.  Generally, Part IV identifies and analyzes the injury to the 
competitive marketplace that results from a horizontal competitor’s act of 
hiring illegal workers.  Specifically, Part IV (a) identifies the economic 
externalities and market distortions associated with the illegal act; (b) 
analyzes the act within the context of the perfectly-competitive model’s 
assumption of certeris parabis; and (c) addresses when, if ever, the illegal 
activity constitutes an act of predation generating a horizontal competitive 
advantage. 
Part V examines and discusses relevant jurisprudential economic and 
antitrust precedent with respect to the (anti)competitive conduct in 
question.  Part V indicates that the act of hiring illegal alien workers at 
below-market wages triggers potential liability under Sections 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act, and also constitutes an unfair trade practice 
under both state and federal laws.  Part V specifically references the 
relevance of the California Unfair Competition Law given that it broadly 
proscribes any “unlawful business act” as constituting an unfair 
competitive practice.  The California statutory model is specifically 
relevant to this article’s discussion regarding the importance of the ceteris 
paribus condition of perfect competition. 
Finally, Part VI concludes by asserting that the conduct of hiring 
illegal workers may indeed constitute an unlawful restraint of trade and/or 
unfair trade practice under both state and federal law.  It posits, however, 
that unambiguous enforcement policies within either regulatory regimes of 
trade or immigration will correct and/or minimize the accompanying 
economic distortions and inefficiencies resulting from such practices. 
II.  GAINING UNFAIR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES BY HIRING ILLEGAL 
ALIENS AND PAYING BELOW-MARKET WAGES 
A.  A Statement of the Problem. 
The United States’ Immigration and Naturalization Act states that it is 
unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire an unauthorized alien worker.4  
 4. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 274A(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) 
(2000) states that 
In general, it is unlawful for a person or other entity—(A) to hire, or to recruit 
or refer a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is 
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Although the title of this article specifies the unfair trade practice of hiring 
illegal workers, it is somewhat of a misnomer.  The mere act of hiring an 
illegal worker does not necessarily translate into an unfair trade practice.  
Nevertheless, if such an act creates a market-distorting, horizontal 
competitive advantage for the hiring firm, then the illegal act may 
potentially constitute an unfair trade practice.  The illegality of hiring a 
non-resident, alien worker is inconsequential, unless it can be demonstrated 
that the illegality of the transaction led to a below-market wage with 
horizontal, anticompetitive effects.  Although the illegal nature of the act 
may be relevant with respect to an issue of intent or the reasonableness of 
the act, the more important issue seems to focus on whether the unlawful 
hiring practice creates a competitive advantage that is ultimately injurious 
to competition. 
B.  Recent Allegations and Case Scenarios—Dancing Around the Issue. 
In recent years there have been several cases asserting allegations of 
competitive and/or commercial advantages arising from a defendant’s act 
of hiring illegal alien workers.5  Although such allegations implicate both 
state and federal antitrust laws, they have seldom been asserted for the 
purpose of seeking direct relief under such laws; and if they did directly 
reference either a state or federal antitrust law, such allegations have yet to 
be decided on the merits of such anticompetitive claims. 
For example, in Larez v. Oberti6 the class action plaintiffs alleged 
[D]efendants willfully and knowingly and in violation of the 
federal Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S. C. 1101 et. seq.) 
induced persons to enter the United States in violation of that act, 
concealed, harbored and sheltered the illegal aliens from 
detection and employed such illegal workers at lower wages in 
competition with domestic workers.  It is stated that at least 20 
an unauthorized alien . . . with respect to such employment, or (B)(i) to hire for 
employment in the United States an individual without complying with the 
requirements of subsection (b) of this section or (ii) if the person or entity is an 
agricultural association, agricultural employer, or farm labor contractor (as 
defined in section 1802 of title 29), to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for 
employment in the United States an individual without complying with the 
requirements of subsection (b) of this section. 
 5. See United States v. Tyson Foods, 258 F. Supp. 2d. 809 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) 
(involving defendant’s use of illegal immigrant labor to gain a business advantage); Answer, 
supra note 2 at 27 (alleging that the use of illegal aliens as a majority of the employees gave 
the Counter-Defendants “an unfair business advantage over legitimate competitors . . . .”); 
see also Complaint, supra note 2 (alleging that defendant’s use of illegal labor for below 
market wages conferred upon defendant an unfair competitive advantage). 
 6. Larez v. Oberti, 23 Cal. App. 3d 217 (Ct. App. 1972). 
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percent of the work force in the areas mentioned consists of such 
workers, which has resulted in the depression of domestic farm 
workers’ wages and working conditions, the creation of excessive 
unemployment among farm workers a
unnecessarily dependent upon welfare.7 
One of the primary grounds upon which the injunctive relief was 
sought by the Larez class-plaintiffs was that the “defendants’ conduct 
amount[ed] to unfair and unlawful competition.”8  The California court, 
however, refrained from granting the requested injunctive relief citing 
several equitable reasons in addition to holding th
igration policy was essentially a federal issue.9 
Seven Lives, Inc. v. Regal Baking Co.10 involved “a trade dress dispute 
over [the use and ownership of] common cookie designs,” betwe
eting bakeries.11  The Defendant filed a counterclaim alleging: 
[C]ounter-Defendants employ[ed] a substantial number of illegal 
aliens in its business operations, probably the majority of their 
employees, which [gave] the Counter-Defendants an unfair 
business ad
Plaintiff.12 
[C]ounter-Defendants maintain[ed] two sets of records with 
which to track employee time to avoid paying employees at the 
legally mandated overtime rates.  The Counter-Defendants [had] . 
. . their employees punch out after working 40 hours in any week 
and then [kept] track of the over time on separate records and 
either [paid] the employee “under the table” or under a different 
social security number to avoid paying overtime rates.  This 
alleged practice [gave] the Counter-Defendants an unfair 
 7. Id. at 220. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 222 (“The federal government could, if it would, reduce the flow of illegal 
entrants to a trickle or virtually dry it up.  Rationalization of social security procedures 
would impede if not bar their access to the employment market.  A paradox of this lawsuit is 
plaintiff’s discerned need for a decree compelling inquiry by California farm operators when 
an agency of the federal government—supplied with an apparatus of offices, staff and 
computerized equipment—is unwilling or unable to conduct that inquiry. . . .  It is more 
orderly, more effectual, less burdensome to the affected interests, that the national 
government redeem its commitment.  Thus the court of equity withholds its aid.” (citing 
Cobos v. Mello-dy Ranch, 20 Cal. App. 3d 947, 950 (1971) as support)). 
 10. No. 00-CV08851 CBM (C.D. Cal. 2000); see supra text accompanying notes 2 and 
5. 
 11. Regal Baking Company Challenges Monaco Baking Company Over Common 
Cookie Designs in Trade Dress Dispute and Seeks $5 Million in Damages, BUSINESS WIRE, 
Oct. 2, 2000, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2000_Oct_2/ai_65637691?tag=content;col1 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Trade Dress Dispute]. 
 12. Answer, supra note 2, at 27; see also Trade Dress Dispute, supra note 11 (quoting 
same from Defendant’s Answer). 
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specific violations of the United States’ immigration laws.18  Although the 
business ad
Plaintiff.13 
The dispute was ultimately resolved by an agreement regulating the 
parties’ rights with respect to the cookie designs in question.14  
Consequently, the Defendant’s counterclaims (colored with allega
ir competition) stalled and were never reached on their merits. 
In United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,15 the United States brought 
criminal charges alleging that “the defendants, aided and abetted by each 
other and by other persons, did knowingly bring to and cause to be brought 
to the United States certain illegal aliens for the purpose of commercial 
advantage and private financial gain.”16  Although a Chattanooga 
Tennessee jury ultimately acquitted the defendants
al immigrants, it nonetheless was reported that: 
[In 2002], Tyson Foods’ CEO made $3.43 million; according to 
the U.S. Government, Tyson Foods also hired thousands of 
undocumented workers who fueled the profits that made such 
rich rewards possible.  Jobs in chicken processing plants, because 
of harsh working conditions, yield annual turnover close to 100 
percent . . . .  Managers were under pressure to produce profits 
and fill low wage jobs as best they can.  While foreigners and 
those who did not speak English appeared to dominate local 
plants—something that should have raised red flags regarding the 
company’s compliance with immigration laws—local plant 
managers chose instead to concentrate on the bottom profit line.  
Such inc
labor.17 
Tyson Foods involved a criminal prosecution alleging various but 
 
 13. Answer, supra note 2, at 27; see also Trade Dress Dispute, supra note 11 (quoting 
(discussing terms of a modified temporary 
. 2d. 809 (E.D. Tenn. 2003). 
 18
same from Defendant’s Answer). 
 14. See Trade Dress Dispute, supra note 11 
restraining order as agreed upon by the parties). 
 15. 258 F. Supp
 16. Id. at 819. 
 17. Lazos, supra note 3. 
. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (2005) states that 
Any person who—(i) knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts to 
bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever such person at a place 
other than a designated port of entry or place other than as designated by the 
Commissioner, regardless of whether such alien has received prior official 
authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States and regardless of 
any future official action which may be taken with respect to such alien; (ii) 
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, 
or remains in the United States in violation of law, transports, or moves or 
attempts to transport or move such alien within the United States by means of 
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facts also implicated potential antitrust liability and unfair acts of 
competition, the government failed to seek any direct relief under either 
state or federal antitrust or unfair competition laws. 
In Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc.,19 “[t]he plaintiffs filed [a] 
class-action complaint alleging that [Defendant’s] widespread and knowing 
employment and harboring of illegal workers allowed [Defendant] to 
reduce labor costs by depressing wages for its legal hourly employees and 
discourag[ing] worker’s-compensation claims, in violation of federal and 
state RICO statutes.”20  Again, the plaintiffs’ allegations were not grounded 
on state or federal antitrust or unfair competition laws, but rather were 
grounded upon state and federal RICO statutes.  It is interesting to note that 
the Eleventh Circuit ultimately affirmed (in part) that the class plaintiffs 
sufficiently alleged claims under both state and federal RICO statutes.21 
 
C. Allegations of Unfair Trade Practices, Restraints of Trade and 
Attempts to Monopolize. 
In 2006, the pleadings filed in Global Horizons, Inc. v. Munger 
Bros.22 finally implicated state antitrust laws by direct reference.  
Specifically, it wa
 
[Defendants] illegally conspired to have illegal immigrant 
undocumented workers used as cheap farm labor . . . .23 
Defendants . . . and others entered into and engaged in an 
unlawful trust in restraint of trade and commerce and [sic] which 
prevents or lessens competition . . . .24 
transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law; (iii) 
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, 
or remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields 
from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such 
alien in any place, including any building or any means of transportation; (iv) 
encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, 
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or 
residence is or will be in violation of law; or (v)(I) engages in any conspiracy to 
commit any of the preceding acts, or (II) aids or abets the commission of any of 
the preceding acts, shall be punished as provided in subparagraph (B).  
 19. 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2016, remanded to 465 F.3d 
1277 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1381 (2007). 
 20. Id. at 1255. 
 21. See Williams, 465 F.3d at 1282-95 (concluding that plaintiffs’ allegations were 
sufficient under state and federal RICO statutes and thus the District Court properly denied 
defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion on those claims). 
 22. See Complaint, supra note 2. 
 23. Id. at 8. 
 24. Id. 
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Entry of new competitors or expansion of the market will not be . 
. . likely, or sufficient to undo the competitive harm that has 
resulted and will continue to result from Defendants [sic] . . . 
attempt to monopolize the supply of commercial farm laborers 
and involvement in the prohibited combination . . . in violation of 
the Cartwright Act, as it was intended to prevent competition in 
the commercial farm laborer industry.25 
There are high barriers to entry or expansion in the market for 
commercial farm laborers.  The barriers include providing 
qualified farm laborers in a manner that is in compliance with 
California State wage and hour laws and Federal immigration and 
work visa laws.26 
Plaintiff . . . as part of its compliance with the H-2A worker visa 
program incurs the expense of arranging transportation of the non 
local workers from and back to their country of origin.  [Plaintiff] 
provides satisfactory housing for all of the non-local workers for 
the entire time they are in this country.  [Plaintiff] pays the 
applicable processing fees to both the Departments of Labor and 
Immigration.  [Plaintiff] manages the laborers’ daily living 
requirements and ensure [sic] that both the housing and job sites 
pass frequent inspections by the applicable agency overseeing 
[Plaintiff’s] treatment of farm laborers.27 
Labor suppliers such as Defendants do not have to incur the cost 
of providing for any of the above expenses . . . .28 
If Defendant’s prohibited combination is allowed to continue 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 9. 
 27. Id.  It merits noting that an employer of an H-2A Visa Holder must incur significant 
increased expenses with respect to the employment of such temporary workers.  For 
example, employers must pay the higher of the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR), the 
applicable prevailing wage, or the statutory minimum wage as specified in the regulations.  
See 20 C.F.R. § 655.107 (2008) (establishing that the higher wage rate must prevail).  As of 
October 7, 2008, the average AEWR reported by the Department of Labor, Employment and 
Training Administration equals $9.43, a rate significantly higher than all reported state and 
federal minimum wage laws.  See 70 Fed. Reg. 10,288, 10,289 (Feb. 26, 2008) (containing 
table establishing Adverse Effect Wage Rates for each state in 2008).  Additionally, 
employers must provide free housing to all temporary workers who are not reasonably able 
to return to their residences on the same day subject to mandatory inspections according to 
appropriate standards; provide either three meals a day to each visa holder or furnish free 
and convenient cooking and kitchen facilities for workers to prepare their own meals; and 
they must reimburse the cost of transportation and subsistence from the place of recruitment 
to the place of work upon the workers completion of 50% of the work contract period.  
Consequently, the economic advantages gained from hiring illegal alien workers at below-
market (or statutory) wage rates is exacerbated when such workers are in direct competition 
with H-2A Visa Holders.  See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(1)-(14) (2008) (discussing minimum 
benefits, wages, and working conditions that must accompany all job offers for H-2A 
applications). 
 28. Complaint, supra note 2, at 9. 
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unabated . . . [c]ompetition in the field of commercial farm labor 
in Kern County will be eliminated or substantially lessened.29 
Unlike the previously mentioned cases, Global Horizons included 
specific allegations directly seeking relief available under California’s 
antitrust statute (the Cartwright Act).30  Although Global Horizons is in its 
incipiency and has yet to be decided on the merits, it illustrates that the 
issue of whether the unlawful hiring of illegal alien workers may constitute 
an unreasonable restraint of trade and/or unfair trade practice under state 
and/or federal antitrust laws is ripe for discussion and analysis. 
Each of the above referenced cases (either indirectly or directly) 
echoed claims of unfair competition, unfair business practices, 
combinations in restraint of trade, and attempts to monopolize.  All of these 
claims, either in isolation or in the aggregate, are likely to substantially 
lessen, if not eliminate, competition in the market place.  As such claims 
begin to resonate among practitioners, jurists and academics alike, the issue 
of whether the unlawful hiring of illegal alien workers at below-market 
wage rates invites an interdisciplinary analysis of such claims from both 
economic and jurisprudential perspectives.  This article begins such an 
interdisciplinary analysis by first addressing the economics of antitrust 
policy. 
III. THE ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
A. The Preservation of Competition. 
Federal antitrust law dictates that it is unlawful to engage in conduct 
that “restrain[s]” or constitutes an “attempt to monopolize” or that 
“monopolize[s]” trade or commerce.31  The Federal Trade Commission 
Act further provides that it is unlawful to engage in conduct that constitutes 
“unfair methods of competition.”32  Most states, if not all, prohibit similar 
anticompetitive conduct and/or unfair methods of competition,33 while 
giving “varying degrees of deference to federal precedent in applying state 
antitrust law to practices also subject to challenge under federal law.”34 
 29. Id. at 9. 
 30. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 3 (“This complaint is filed and this action is 
instituted under the Cartwright Act . . . for an unlawful trust, agreement, understanding, and 
concert of action.”). 
 31. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 32. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 33. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 1 STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICES AND 
STATUTES 1:22 (3d ed. 2004) (“Today, virtually every state has an antitrust statute of one 
sort or another, as do the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands.”). 
 34. Id. at 1:22-23; see also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION:  MONOGRAPH NO. 15, ANTITRUST 
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The central purpose of both state and federal antitrust legislation is “to 
preserve competition in those markets where competitive policy has not 
been displaced by direct governmental regulation or exemption.”35  Thus, 
the study of antitrust law necessarily involves the study of competition:  
“[i]t is a body of law that seeks to assure competitive markets through the 
interaction of sellers and buyers in the dynamic process of exchange.”36  
Although the legislative history of the Sherman Act reveals multiple goals 
and values expressed by its proponents,37 the antitrust laws are 
contemporarily understood as having been “written foremost to encourage 
competition.”38  It is, accordingly, of little surprise that “[e]conomists 
generally view antitrust as a set of laws designed to promote competition, 
and therefore, economic efficiency.”39 
FEDERALISM:  THE ROLE OF STATE LAW (1988) (discussing the tension between federal and 
state enforcement of the same substantive antitrust law principals). 
 35. PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, 2B ANTITRUST LAW, 
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, 3-4 (3d ed. 2007). 
 36. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS 
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 1 (4th ed. 2003). 
 37. For example, “[t]he Congress that passed the Sherman Act was concerned with 
business concentration, acquisition of monopoly power, cartels,” “[e]ntrepreneurial 
independence,” dispersion of “economic power,” stimulation of “access to free markets,” 
and protection of (a) “consumers from a redistribution of wealth from consumers to 
monopolists,” and (b) “competitors from predatory practices.”  Id. at 3 (citing S.1 51st 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1889), reprinted in THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 89 (E. Kintner ed. 1978), 21 Cong. Rec. 2460, 2457, 3146, 
3152 (1890)); see also STEPHEN ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 6-11 (1993) (noting 
that the goals of the Sherman Act included protection of small businesses and dispersion of 
economic power); Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. 
L. REV. 377 (1965) (rebutting allegations that the Sherman and Clayton Acts are being 
enforced in a way that is anticompetitive rather than preserving competition and protecting 
customers); John J. Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence:  A Symposium on the Economic, 
Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977) (observing 
that the motivations behind antitrust are obscure); Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of 
Antitrust:  A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981) (examining the contention 
that antitrust laws should be used solely to promote economic efficiency); Robert H. Lande, 
Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:  The Efficiency 
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 68, 70 (1982) (stating that there is 
continued debate over Congress’ intentions when passing antitrust legislation); Louis B. 
Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 
(1979) (stating that one congressional goal of passing antitrust legislation was to remedy 
unjust discrimination); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger 
Court’s Antitrust Policy:  The First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1982) 
(stating that the Burger Court adopted a competition efficiency paradigm in its approach to 
antitrust law). 
 38. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 36, at 4. 
 39. W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 70 (4th ed. 2005). 
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B. The Objective of Perfect Competition—Efficiency. 
 
Economic theory has long acknowledged that the given environment 
within which society functions is constrained by scarcity, and that such 
scarcity is the fundamental source of social and political conflict.40  Given 
such scarcity, all societies are confronted with the problem of determining 
(1) “[w]hat, and how much, to produce,” (2) “[h]ow to produce it,” and (3) 
“[f]or whom to produce it.”41  The field of microeconomics has 
demonstrated that the adoption of the perfectly-competitive model provides 
a remarkable social mechanism with which to administer the social 
problems generated by scarcity.  The perfectly-competitive model 
ultimately nurtures, if not ensures, efficiencies in the allocation, production 
and distribution of scarce resources.42  As Figure 1 demonstrates, the 
unfettered forces of supply and demand determine an efficient quantity of 
production for any given good or service (Qe), as well as a market clearing 
price with respect to that good or service (Pe);43 it is at this point that the 
market achieves equilibrium. 
 40. See DAVID C. COLANDER, MICROECONOMICS 5 (5th ed. 2004) (discussing how 
scarcity and the unwillingness of individuals to solve the problem lead to basic economic 
problems). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 35, at 5 (“A perfectly competitive 
economy produces an equilibrium that yields efficient use of resources in both the 
productive and allocative senses.  Productive efficiency means that firms maximize 
operating efficiency by producing all goods and services at least cost.  Allocative efficiency 
entails that resources are allocated among the production of various goods and services so 
that no reallocation of inputs and outputs could increase the aggregate consumer welfare by 
making some consumers better off without making others worse off.”). 
 43. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 23-24 (5th ed. 
2001) (“The two curves intersect at the equilibrium, or market-clearing price and quantity.  
At this price [Pe], the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded are just equal (to Qe).  
The market mechanism is the tendency in a free market for the price to change until the 
market clears—i.e., until the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded are equal.  At this 
point because there is neither excess demand nor excess supply, there is no pressure for the 
price to change further.  Supply and demand might not always be in equilibrium, and some 
markets might not clear quickly when conditions change suddenly.  The tendency is for 
markets to clear.”). 
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Figure 1 illustrates the market demand and supply curves for a given 
good in a competitive market.  The firm’s individual supply curve is 
derived from its marginal cost curve,44 that is, as long as the market price 
for a given good equals or exceeds the marginal cost to produce that good, 
a firm will produce and supply a given good.45  The market or industry 
supply curve is derived from the horizontal summation of all the marginal-
cost curves of the competing individual firms (i.e., the horizontal 
summation of their individual firm supply curves).46  The industry or 
Q 
P 
Pe 
Qe
Demand 
Supply = ∑ MC 
P´ 
P´´
Figure 1: 
THE UNFETTERED FORCES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND: 
Q´´Q´
 44. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 125-26 (18th ed. 
2005) (“Marginal cost is one the most important concepts in all of economics.  Marginal 
cost (MC) denotes the extra or additional cost of producing 1 extra unit of output.”); see 
also infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
 45. See COLANDER, supra note 40, at 247 (“Since the marginal cost curve tells the firm 
how much to produce, the marginal cost curve is the perfectly competitive firm’s supply 
curve.”); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD supra note 43, at 263 (“[T]he firm’s supply curve is the 
portion of its marginal cost curve that lies above the average economic cost curve.”); 
VISCUSI, HARRINGTON, JR. & VERNON, supra note 39, at 80 (“The individual firms’ supply 
curves are their marginal cost curves; hence we can think of the supply curve [above] as the 
industry’s marginal cost curve.”); see also infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
 46. See COLANDER, supra note 40, at 254 (“In the short run when the number of firms 
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market supply curve reflects the schedule of prices at which firms are 
willing to supply a given quantity of any good or service.  As price 
increases, rational firms are willing to supply more and more, and thus the 
more the market or industry is willing to supply.  Given the positive 
relationship between the price of a good or service and the quantity 
supplied, the slope of the market or industry supply curve is also positive.47 
The industry or market demand curve “can be viewed as a schedule of 
the marginal willingness-to-pay of customers.”48  In Figure 1 above, the 
competitive equilibrium price (Pe) equals the industry’s marginal cost of 
production at the equilibrium output Qe.49  Should the market only produce 
Q´ units of the good or service in question, economic waste results because 
the marginal willingness-to-pay exceeds the marginal cost to produce 
additional units of the good or service.  Should the market produce Q´´ 
units of the good or service in question, economic waste results because the 
marginal cost to produce Q´´ units exceeds the marginal willingness-to-pay.  
Figure 1 ultimately demonstrates that the unfettered forces of supply and 
demand in a perfectly competitive market determines a market clearing 
quantity (Qe) and a corresponding price (Pe), thereby answering the 
profound political/economic question of what and how much society 
should produce of a given good or service given the constraints of scarcity. 
In equilibrium[,] price will equal marginal cost for all goods and 
services, and rates of return (adjusted for risk) on investment in 
the various markets will be equal and just sufficient to maintain 
investment at current levels.  Since each price reflects the value 
of each product to the marginal buyer, and since each price 
equals the cost of the marginal unit of output, consumer welfare 
is maximized; any rearrangement of inputs and outputs can only 
in the market is fixed, the market supply curve is just the horizontal sum of all the firms’ 
marginal cost curves, taking account of any changes in input prices that might occur.”); 
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 267 (“The short-run industry supply curve is the 
summation of the supply curves of the individual firms.”); VISCUSI, HARRINGTON, JR. & 
VERNON, supra note 39, at 80 (“The competitive industry’s supply curve is found by 
horizontal aggregation of the supply curves of individual firms.”); see also infra note 83 and 
accompanying text. 
 47. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 44, at 51 (“One important reason for the 
upward slope is ‘the law of diminishing returns’ . . . .  Wine will illustrate this important 
law.  If society wants more wine, then additional labor will have to be added to the limited 
land sites suitable for producing wine grapes.  Each new worker will be adding less and less 
extra product.  The price needed to coax out additional wine output is therefore higher.  By 
raising the price of wine, society can persuade wine producers to produce and sell more 
wine; the supply curve for wine is therefore upward-sloping.”). 
 48. VISCUSI, HARRINGTON, JR. & VERNON, supra note 39, at 81 (footnote omitted). 
 49. See id. (“[A]t the competitive equilibrium (price P*, output Q*), the marginal 
willingness-to-pay P* exactly equals marginal cost at the output Q*.”). 
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decrease the aggregate value of what consumers receive.50 
Thus, perfect competition minimizes waste by minimizing the risk of 
under- or over-production.  As a result, supply equals demand, and 
resources are allocated and distributed to those who value them most. 
C.  The Operational Conditions of Perfect Competition. 
The underlying assumptions (or rather, the antecedent conditions) of 
the perfectly-competitive model51 essentially consist of the following: 
1. The existence of numerous buyers and sellers,52 each acting 
independently53 and rationally;54 
2. Each buyer and seller consumes or produces such a negligible 
amount of the total output such that no one buyer or seller can 
influence price by the amount he either consumes or produces;55 
 50. See AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 35, at 6. 
 51. See COLANDER, supra note 40, at 242 (outlining the “[n]ecessary [c]onditions for 
[p]erfect [c]ompetition” to thrive). 
 52. See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND 
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 13 (16th ed. 2004) (“When the number of participants becomes really 
great, some hope emerges that the influence of every particular participant will become 
negligible, and that the above difficulties may recede and a more conventional theory 
become possible.  These are, of course, the classical conditions of ‘free competition.’  
Indeed, this was the starting point of much of what is best in economic theory.”); see also 
EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICS 356-57 (11th ed. 2004) (“The firm in 
a perfectly competitive market has so many rivals that competition becomes impersonal in 
the extreme . . . .  A competitive firm faces so little of the market demand that its effective 
demand curve is horizontal at whatever price the market will bear.  A competitive firm can 
decide only the output that it would like to supply to the market given that price.”); PINDYCK 
& RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 327 (“In a perfectly competitive market, the large number 
of sellers and buyers of a good ensures that no single seller or buyer can affect its price.  The 
market-forces of supply and demand determine price.”). 
 53. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 430 (“In [competitive] markets, each 
firm could take price or market demand as given and largely ignore its competitors.  In an 
oligopolistic market, however, a firm sets price or output based partly on strategic 
considerations regarding the behavior of its competitors.”).  See also AREEDA, HOVENKAMP 
& SOLOW, supra note 35, at 5 (“Each seller and buyer makes decisions independently, 
without agreement with or influence of others.”); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 
426, 433-34 (“Unlike the case of . . . competition, the supply side of an oligopoly market is 
composed of a few firms . . . .  Conditions in oligopolistic industries tend to promote 
collusion, since the number of firms is small and the firms recognize their interdependence.  
The advantages to the firms of collusion seem obvious:  increased profits, decreased 
uncertainty, and a better opportunity to prevent others’ entry.”). 
 54. STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY & APPLICATIONS 634 (6th ed. 2005) (“[T]he 
economist assumes that people are rational.”); see also AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, 
supra note 35 (discussing rational choice as an equimarginal principle.). 
 55. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 252 (“Because each individual firm 
sells a sufficiently small proportion of total market output, its decisions have no impact on 
market price . . . .   The assumption of price taking applies to consumers as well as firms.”); 
see also AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 35, at 5 (“Sellers and buyers are so 
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3. There are no barriers to entry or exit with respect to consumer 
or producer markets;56 
4. All market participants, that is, all buyers and sellers, are fully 
informed of all relevant economic and technological data;57 
5. All products are homogeneous or, rather, constitute 
interchangeable substitutes for each other;58 and 
6. The forces of supply and demand are free to determine the 
quantity of output in a relevant market, and to determine a 
market-clearing, competitive price of such output.59 
7. Ceteris Paribus, i.e., all other influences relevant to the 
numerous that no individual’s output or purchasing decision has any perceptible impact on 
output or price.”); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 290 (“[P]erfect competition 
requires that each participant in the market, whether a buyer or a seller, be so small in 
relation to the entire market that he or she cannot affect the product’s price.”). 
 56. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 253 (“[F]ree entry (exit), means that 
there are no special costs that make it difficult for a new firm either to enter an industry and 
produce or to exit if it cannot make a profit.  As a result, buyers can easily switch from one 
supplier to another, and suppliers can easily enter or exit a market.”).  See also AREEDA, 
HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 35, at 5 (“All productive resources are freely mobile 
among markets; there are no barriers to entry or exit.”); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, 
at 290 (“Perfect competition also requires that all resources be completely mobile.  Each 
resource must, in other words, be able to enter or leave the market with ease and to switch 
from one use to another without fuss or bother.”). 
 57. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 595 (“[W]e have assumed that 
consumers and producers have complete information about the economic variables that are 
relevant for the choices they face.”); see also AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 
35, at 5 (“All sellers and buyers have sufficient knowledge of all production techniques, 
input costs, prices, and other relevant market facts.”); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 
290-91 (“[P]erfect competition requires that consumers, firms, and resource owners have 
perfect knowledge of the relevant economic and technological data.  Consumers must be 
aware of all prices.  Laborers and owners of capital must be aware of how much their 
resources will bring in all possible uses.  Firms must know the prices of all inputs and the 
characteristics of all relevant technologies.  And in its purest sense, perfect competition 
requires that all of these economic decision-making units have an accurate knowledge of the 
past, present, and the future.”). 
 58. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 252 (“Price-taking behavior typically 
occurs in markets where firms produce identical, or nearly identical, products.  When the 
products of all of the firms are perfectly substitutable with one another—that is, when they 
are homogeneous—no firm can raise the price of its product above the price of other firms 
without losing most or all of its business.”); see also MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 
405 (describing perfectly competitive situations as those in which numerous firms produce 
and sell goods that are “completely homogenous from one seller to another.”). 
 59. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 55 (“The market mechanism is the 
tendency for supply and demand to equilibrate (i.e., for price to move to the market-clearing 
level), so that there is neither excess demand nor excess supply.”); see also MANSFIELD & 
YOHE, supra note 52, at 347-48 (“We have seen that a perfectly competitive economy 
maximizes the total net gain of consumers and producers.  We then showed . . . how dead-
weight losses—reductions in economic efficiency—result if the government [obstructs the 
forces of supply and demand by imposing] a price ceiling . . ., a price floor . . ., a tariff, a 
quota, or an excise tax.”). 
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perfectly-competitive model’s performance are equal.60 
According to microeconomic theory, if these conditions hold, the 
perfectly-competitive model will create efficiencies in consumption, 
production, and allocation.61  And it is through the creation of such 
efficiencies that a perfectly competitive market promises the greatest social 
opportunity for wealth creation.  Or in antitrust parlance, it promises 
greater output at lower prices.62 
D. Perfect Competition and its Condition of Rationality. 
Central to the perfectly-competitive model is the assumption that all 
market participants are rational, with rational action being defined by the 
principle of utility/profit maximization.63  Any act of consumption or 
 60. See WALTER NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION 56 
(9th ed. 2004) [hereinafter NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS] (“Much 
economic analysis is based on this ceteris paribus (other things being equal) assumption.  
[For example,] [w]e can simplify the analysis of a person’s consumption decisions by 
assuming that satisfaction is affected only by choices made among the options being 
considered.  All other effects on satisfaction are assumed to remain constant.  In this way we 
can isolate the economic factors that affect consumption behavior.  This narrow focus is not 
intended to imply that other things that affect utility are unimportant; we are conceptually 
holding these other factors constant so that we may study choices in a simplified setting.”); 
see also WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSION 
649 (9th ed. 2005) [hereinafter NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY] (defining the Ceteris 
Paribus Assumption as “[t]he assumption that all other relevant factors are held constant 
when examining the influence of one particular variable in an economic model”). 
 61. See VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra, note 52 at 14 (“The current assertions 
concerning free competition appear to be very valuable surmises and inspiring anticipations 
of results.  But they are not results and it is scientifically unsound to treat them as such as 
along as the conditions which we mentioned above are not satisfied.”). 
 62. Sanderson v. Culligan Int’l Co., 415 F. 3d. 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Judge 
Easterbrook’s explanation that “[a]ntitrust law condemns practices that drive up prices by 
curtailing output” (citations omitted)). 
 63. See COLANDER, supra note 40, at 6-8, 239 (describing the “profit-maximizing 
entrepreneurial” nature of firms); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 254 (“The 
assumption of profit maximization is frequently used in microeconomics because it predicts 
business behavior reasonably accurately and avoids unnecessary analytical complications.”); 
see also COLANDER, supra note 40, at 181 (“The analysis of rational choice is the analysis of 
how individuals choose goods within their budget in order to maximize total utility, and 
how maximizing total utility can be accomplished by considering marginal utility.  That 
analysis begins with the premise that rational individuals want as much satisfaction as they 
can get from their available resources.  The term rational in economics means, specifically, 
that people prefer more to less and will make choices that give them as much satisfaction as 
possible.”); LANDSBURG, supra note 54, at 634 (“The economist assumes that people act 
according to the principle of equimarginality.  This is often expressed by saying that the 
economist assume that people are rational.  Indeed, it has been said that a student becomes a 
true economist on the day when he fully understands and accepts the principle that people 
equate costs and benefits at the margin.”); EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS:  THEORY 
AND APPLICATIONS 55 (6th ed. 1988) (“Given the consumer’s tastes, we assume that he or 
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production that fails to maximize the utility or profit of an individual or 
firm is considered to be irrational economic behavior.  Consequently, in 
order to act rationally, all market participants must be fully informed of all 
costs and benefits associated with their respective economic activities.64  
Once informed, an economically rational actor will weigh his or her costs 
and benefits, and if the benefits exceed or equal his or her costs, he or she 
will engage in such activity.65  Consumers choose consumption levels that 
maximize their interpersonal utility (i.e., satisfaction), given their specific 
budget constraints.66  Consumer utility is maximized where the marginal 
benefit of an act of consumption is equal to its marginal cost.67  Firms 
choose output levels at which their marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost.68  Economic rationality necessarily requires that all costs and benefits 
be considered when exercising economic choices.  To the extent all such 
costs and benefits are not considered, in that they are external to the 
rational decision making process, non-utility/profit-maximizing choices 
will be made resulting in unacceptable market inefficiencies.69 
 
she is rational, in the sense that he or she tries to maximize utility.”); STEPHEN A. MATHIS & 
JANET KOSCIANSKI, MICROECONOMIC THEORY:  AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 2 (2002) 
(“[M]aking rational choices is a matter of choosing amount(s) of some decision, or 
independent, variable(s) such that the extra benefit received from the last unit chosen is just 
equal to its extra costs.  In economics, the process of measuring and comparing the extra 
benefits and extra costs associated with a rational decision is known as marginal analysis.”). 
 64. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 290 (“[P]erfect competition requires that 
consumers, firms, and resource owners have perfect knowledge of the relevant economic 
and technological data.  Firms must know the prices of all inputs and the characteristics of 
all relevant technologies.  And in its purest sense, perfect competition requires that all of 
these economic decisions-making units have an accurate knowledge of the past, the present, 
and the future.”). 
 65. See ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, CONCEPTS AND 
PRACTICE 31 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining the net benefits criterion, which only encourages 
adopting policies that maximize net benefits). 
 66. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 79 (discussing how consumers choose 
which goods they will buy). 
 67. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 80 (“[S]atisfaction is maximized when 
the marginal benefit—the benefit associated with the consumption of one additional unit of 
food—is equal to the marginal cost—the cost of the additional unit of food.”). 
 68. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 259. 
 69. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 675 (“[P]roducers act in ways that cause 
harm to others without paying the full cost of the damage.  In these and other, similar cases, 
the pursuit of private gain will not necessarily promote the social welfare.”). 
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E.  Operational and Allocative Efficiency—The Perfectly-Competitive 
Model’s Long-Run Equilibrium.70 
Operationally: 
Competitive conditions ultimately force each firm in each market 
to produce at the least possible cost permitted by known 
techniques.  Firms that fail to do so may temporarily break even 
or perhaps make modest profits when demand is high, but will 
incur losses and eventually disappear as resources commanded 
by more efficient firms move into the market.  In long-run 
equilibrium, each firm will be producing at minimum average 
total cost in plants of most efficient scale.71 
Allocatively: 
The key conditions creating optimal allocative efficiency are 
sufficiently large numbers of sellers and buyers in each market 
and resource mobility.  Where each individual seller’s output 
decisions have no perceptible effect on price as given, any profit 
maximization will impel each to produce that output at which the 
added cost of the last unit (marginal cost) just equals price.  If at 
that point the sellers in some markets are earning higher profits, 
(revenues in excess of total costs) then sellers in other markets 
[and] resources will flow from the low-return to the high-return 
markets until returns are equalized.  In equilibrium, price will 
equal marginal cost for all goods and services, and rates of return 
(adjusted for risk) on investment in the various markets will be 
equal and just sufficient to maintain investment at current levels.  
Since each price equals the cost of the marginal unit of output, 
consumer welfare is maximized; any rearrangement of inputs and 
outputs can only decrease the aggregate value of what consumers 
receive.72 
 70. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 272-77 (providing a detailed and 
robust discussion of the long-run equilibrium in competition). 
 71. AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 35, at 6. 
 72. Id. at 6. 
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PERFECT COMPETITION IN THE SHORT-RUN & 
THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM Figure 2 
Firm in Competition Market Supply and Demand 
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Figure 2 above illustrates short-run producer surplus73 for a profit-
maximizing (rational), price-taking firm in a competitive market.74  As a 
price-taker,75 the market dictates an equilibrium quantity at a market 
clearing price Pe.  Acting independently76 and rationally,77 the firm will 
seek to maximize profits at QS, where its marginal revenue equals its short-
run marginal costs (SMC = PC = Pe).78  Because of the price-taking 
 73. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 269 (“If marginal cost is rising, the price 
of the product is greater than marginal cost for every unit produced except the last one.  As a 
result, firms earn a surplus on all but the last unit of output.  The producer surplus of a firm 
is the sum over all units produced of the differences between the market price of the good 
and the marginal costs of production.  Just as consumer surplus measures all of the area 
below an individual’s demand curve and above the market price, producer surplus measures 
the area above a producer’s supply curve and below the market price.”). 
 74. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 269-71 (explaining the measure of 
producer surplus in the short run). 
 75. See supra note 55 for an explanation of the price-taking condition of perfect 
competition as a function of both the number of competitive firms in the market and their 
respective market shares with respect to units produced.  For example, given the number of 
firms and their respective productive capacities, no one firm can influence price by the 
amount of inputs it consumes or units it produces. 
 76. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 77. See supra notes 54 and 63 and accompanying text. 
 
 78. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 269 (“Figure 8.11 illustrates short-run 
producer surplus for a firm.  The profit-maximizing output is [QS] where [PC = SMC].  The 
producer surplus is then the sum of these “unit surpluses” over all units that the firm 
produces.  It is given by the . . . [the area under the PC –price-line, the firm’s perceived 
horizontal demand curve] and above its marginal cost curve [SMC], from zero output to the 
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condition, an individual firm in competition perceives a perfectly elastic, 
horizontal demand curve (dith).  Since the forces of supply and demand set a 
market clearing price of Pe, a firm perceives an infinite demand—i.e., it can 
and will sell all of its units of production at whatever price the market sets.  
For each unit sold, the firm will be paid the market price of Pe = PC; and for 
each additional unit sold by the firm, the firm will receive additional 
revenue equal to the market price of Pe = PC.  The market price (Pe) equals 
the firm’s marginal revenue (MR) associated with the firm’s additional unit 
sales.79  Consequently, the firm’s short-run marginal revenue curve 
corresponds to its perceived individual demand curve (dith).80 
The firm’s individual supply curve corresponds to its marginal cost 
curve;81 it reflects the various quantities of output the firm is willing to 
supply with respect to a corresponding schedule of prices.82  The market 
supply curve may roughly be approximated by “the horizontal summation 
of the short-run supply curves of all the firms in the industry.”83  In Figure 
profit-maximizing output.”). 
 79. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 245 (defining “marginal revenue:  the 
change in revenue resulting from a one-unit increase in output.”); see also COLANDER, supra 
note 40, at 245 (“Since profit is the difference between total revenue and total cost, what 
happens to profit in response to a change in output is determined by marginal revenue (MR), 
the change in total revenue associated with a change in quantity . . . .”); NICHOLSON, 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 60, at 251-52 (“It is the revenue obtained from selling 
one more unit of output that is relevant to the profit-maximizing firm’s output decision.  If 
the firm can sell all it wishes without having any effect on market price, the market price 
will indeed be the extra revenue obtained from selling one more unit.  Phrased another way, 
if a firm’s output decisions will not affect market price, marginal revenue is equal to the 
price at which the unit sells.”). 
 80. See MARK HIRSCHEY, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 384 (10th ed. 2003) (“[T]he firm’s 
demand curve is seen to be, for all practical purposes, a horizontal line.  Thus, it is clear that 
under perfect competition, the individual firm’s output decisions do not affect price in any 
meaningful way.  Price can be assumed constant irrespective of the output level at which the 
firm chooses to operate.”); see also MARK HIRSCHEY, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 386 Figure 
10.3 (illustrating that “[f]irms face horizontal curves in perfectly competitive markets”). 
 81. See id. at 389 (“The perfectly competitive firm’s short-run supply curve 
corresponds to that portion of the marginal cost curve that lies above the average variable 
cost curve.”); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 296 (“The short-run supply curve is, by 
construction, exactly the same as the firm’s short-run marginal-cost curve . . . .”).  Similar 
to the term marginal revenue, marginal cost “is the increase (decrease) in total cost from 
increasing (or decreasing) the level of output by one unit.”  COLANDER, supra note 40 at 
259; see also supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (explaining how the basic theory of 
the firm is to maximize their profits). 
 82. See NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 60, at 257 (“The firm’s 
short-run supply curve show how much it will produce at various possible prices.  For a 
profit-maximizing firm that takes the price of its output as given, this curve consists of the 
positively sloped segment of the firm’s short-run marginal cost above the point of minimum 
average variable cost.”). 
 83. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 297; see also COLANDER, supra note 40, at 
254 (“In the short-run when the number of firms in the market is fixed, the market supply 
curve is just the horizontal sum of all the firm’s marginal cost curves, taking account of any 
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2, the firm produces QS units, given a market price of Pe = Pc, reaping 
short-run profits (πs) equal to the area of ABCD.84 
It is noted that “[a] firm need not always earn a profit in the short-
run.”85  In fact, as a price-taker, the firm may find itself confronted with a 
market price that falls below its short-run average costs (Pe < SAC) and 
thus be forced to operate at a loss or exit the industry.  Under such 
circumstances, a firm may nonetheless continue to operate at a short-run 
loss because it expects to earn profits in the future “when the price of its 
product increases or the cost of production falls, and because shutting down 
and starting up again would be costly.”86  If the market price, however, “is 
less than [short-run] average variable costs, the firm should produce 
nothing and incur a loss equal to total fixed costs.  Losses will increase if 
any output is produced and sold when P < [SAVC].”87  Under such 
circumstances, the firm should shut down and exit the industry. 
The perfectly-competitive model’s lack of entry and exit barriers88 
suggests that profits attract market entry.  When a firm experiences losses, 
such losses encourage market exit.  Such entry and exit cause market 
supply to expand or contract as reflected by a shift of the market supply 
curve (S) either to the right or left, respectively.  For example, Figure 3 
below illustrates the impact on the firm’s profits in competition as such 
profits attract entry.  For the purpose of simplicity, it is assumed that “there 
are no sunk costs so that average economic cost is equal to average total 
cost.”89  Attracted by the profits reflected in Figure 3, firms enter the 
market, causing the supply curve (S) to shift to (S'), causing the market 
price to fall to PC', which is below the firm’s short-run average cost curve 
(SAC).  At a market price equal to PC', the firm experiences losses equal to 
the area of rectangle ABCD.  And since it is assumed that no sunk costs 
exist, the firm can easily exit the market and invest its capital in other 
markets with higher returns.90  Thus, “the firm should shut down when the 
changes in input prices that might occur.”); HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 389 (“Market 
supply curves are the sum of supply for individual firms at various prices.”). 
 84. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 269-71 (explaining the formula π 
(profit) = Total Revenues (TR) – Total Costs (TC); TR = PC * QS = area of ABFE; TC = PI 
(Average Cost of Inputs) * QS = area of DCFE; πS = area of ABCD = area of ABFE (total 
revenue) – area of DCFE (total costs)). 
 85. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 259. 
 86. Id. 
 87. HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 389 (“If price exceeds average variable costs, then each 
unit of output provides at least some profit contribution to help cover fixed costs and 
provide profit.  The minimum point on the firm’s average variable cost curve determines the 
lower limit, or cutoff point, of its supply schedule.”). 
 88. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (defining free entry as the absence of 
special costs associated with beginning or halting operations in a market). 
 89. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 259. 
 90. See id. (explaining firm incentives in the absence of sunk costs). 
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price of its product is less than the average total cost at the profit-
maximizing output.”91 
Firm in Competition Market Supply and Demand 
A B 
C D 
D
S
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SMC = Sith firm 
SAC 
PC' 
Figure 3 
PERFECT COMPETITION IN THE SHORT-RUN & 
THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM AFTER COMPETITIVE ENTRY 
QS 
 
With the decline of the market price to PC' and the resulting short-run 
losses, the hypothetical firm above (as well as other firms similarly 
situated) will rationally opt to exit the market.  Thus, market supply will 
contract, as reflected by a shift of the market supply curve from S' to S'' 
illustrated in Figure 4 below.92  Ultimately, a long-run competitive 
equilibrium is reached when all firms in the market are maximizing profits 
at the new competitive equilibrium price, PC'' = SAC = SMC.  At PC'', the 
firm is earning zero economic profits, which “means that the firm is 
earning a normal—i.e., competitive—return on that investment.”93  Stated 
 91. Id. 
 92. COLANDER, supra note 40, at 255 (“[I]f the price is lower than the price necessary to 
earn a profit, firms incurring losses will leave the market and the market supply curve will 
shift to the left.  As market supply shifts to the left, market price will rise.  Firms will 
continue to exit the market and market price will continue to rise until all remaining firms 
no longer incur losses and earn zero profit.  Only at zero profit do entry and exit stop.”). 
 
 93. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 273; see also COLANDER, supra note 40, 
at 255 (“Zero profit does not mean that entrepreneurs don’t get anything for their efforts.  
The entrepreneur is an input to production just like any other factor of production.  In order 
to stay in the business the entrepreneur must receive the opportunity cost, or normal profit 
(the amount the owners of business would have received in the next-best alternative).  That 
normal profit is built into the costs of the firm; economic profits are profits above normal 
profits.”); DOMINICK SALVATORE, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 332 
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differently, a firm earning a normal return on its investment “is doing as 
well . . . as it could by investing elsewhere.”94  As one economist explains, 
“[i]f the owner manages the firm, zero economic profits also include what 
he or she would earn in the best alternative occupation (i.e., managing the 
firm for someone else).  Thus, zero economic profits means that the total 
revenues of the firm just cover all costs (explicit and implicit).”95 
 
Firm in Competition Market Supply and Demand 
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S''
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SMC = Sith firm 
PC'' 
Figure 4 
LONG-RUN COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM & 
THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM AFTER COMPETITIVE EXIT 
QS 
 
In figure 4 above, there is little incentive for the firm to exit the 
market; similarly, there is little incentive for other firms to enter the 
market.96  In summary: 
[F]irms in long-run equilibrium must produce at the minimum of 
their long-run average-cost curves.  How so?  Firms set price 
equal to long-run marginal cost to maximize their economic 
(5th ed. 2004) (“When a perfectly competitive market is in long-run equilibrium, firms 
break even and earn zero economic profits.  Therefore, the owner of the firm receives only a 
normal return on investment or an amount equal to what he or she would earn by investing 
his or her funds in the best alternative venture of similar risk.”). 
 94. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 273. 
 95. SALVATORE, supra note 93, at 332. 
 
 96. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 274 (outlining the conditions under long-
run competitive equilibrium). 
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profits.  But long-run equilibrium in the market can be sustained 
only if price equals long-run average cost so that economic 
profits are equal to [zero] and returns to employed resources are 
normal.  And both of these conditions are satisfied only where 
long-run marginal cost equals long-run average cost at the 
minimum of the long-run average cost curve.97 
The zero economic profit condition of the perfectly-competitive 
model’s long-run equilibrium “is enormously powerful.”98  It ultimately 
explains and demonstrates the importance of the model’s underlying 
conditions—i.e., (a) numerous price-taking buyers and sellers, (b) each 
acting independently and rationally, (c) subject to little, if any, entry and 
exit barriers, (d) all acting upon complete and accurate market information 
involving the demand and supply for a homogeneous good (e) with little or 
no governmental intervention and interference or obstruction of the 
equilibrating forces of supply and demand, with all other potential 
influences remaining constant or equal (ceteris paribus).  When these 
conditions hold, the perfectly competitive market guides and directs scarce 
resources to their highest and most valued uses, and thereby minimizes, if 
not eliminates, waste. 
If economic profits are being earned in any given competitive market, 
rational firms will exit their existing market where they are earning only 
normal profits and redirect their resources to the more profitable market.  
Provided there are no barriers to exit and entry, and provided that all 
competing firms have access to complete and accurate market information, 
competitive entry will chisel away at the otherwise-available profits until a 
long-run equilibrium of zero economic, but normal profits is reached.  
Upon attaining such a long-run equilibrium, rational firms are faced with 
the choice of (1) being satisfied with earning normal profits, (2) pursuing 
cost-saving innovations necessary for the firm to earn above-normal, 
economic profits once again (attracting additional competitive entry), or (3) 
exiting the market in search of above-normal, economic profits elsewhere. 
Option 1 (being satisfied with earning normal profits) is dangerous, 
especially if other competitors continue to seek cost-saving innovations.  
Complacency in the market may lead to market exit.  Option 2 (pursuing 
cost-saving innovations necessary to once again earn above-normal, 
economic profits) is rational from both short- and long-run perspectives.  In 
the short-run, success in the discovery and implementation of cost-saving 
 97. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 307. 
 98. COLANDER, supra note 40, at 255 (“[I]t makes the analysis of competitive markets 
far more applicable to the real world than can a strict application of the assumption of 
perfect competition.  If economic profit is being made, firms will enter and compete [sic] 
that profit away.  Price will be pushed down to the average total cost of production as long 
as there are no barriers to entry.”). 
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innovations will likely lead to short-run economic profits.  In the long-run, 
such innovations will continue to drive input costs down, making more 
goods available at decreasing market prices.  Option 3 (exiting the market 
and searching for above-normal, economic profits elsewhere) may have a 
temporary, but slight, short-run effect on the market from which the firm is 
exiting.  It will, however, have a countervailing short-run effect on the 
market that the resources ultimately enter, with both markets subject to a 
renewed long-run equilibrium of normal profits.99 
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Figure 5 
PERFECT COMPETITION IN THE LONG-RUN & 
THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM AFTER COMPETITIVE EXIT 
 
Figure 5 above illustrates the continued competitive pressure on a 
firm’s cost structure.  As firms exit the market to minimize and/or eliminate 
their short-run losses and seek normal or above-normal profits elsewhere, 
the market supply curve (S') contracts and shifts to the left to (S''),100 
 99. See HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 404 for a more detailed discussion on competitive 
strategy in perfectly competitive markets.  “Competitive strategy is the search for a 
favorable competitive position and durable above normal profits in an industry or line of 
business.”  Id. 
 
 100. See HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 74 (“In functional form, a supply function can be 
expressed as Quantity of Product X Supplied= f(Price of X, Prices of Related Goods, Input 
Prices, Weather, and so on.”).  And as previously stated, the market supply curve is derived 
from the horizontal summation of all of the individual firms’ marginal-cost curves.  See 
supra note 46 and accompanying text.  Consequently, as firms leave the market, the market 
supply curve will shift to the left, especially since it is a function of the number of suppliers 
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natur
too 
lenient toward restraints or other limitations on innovation.102 
 
people.”103  Note Smith’s observation was dependent on a qualified, 
 
resulting in a new competitive price of (PC'').  At (PC''), the firm earns 
normal profits.  The desire to earn economic profits (above normal profits) 
places long-run downward pressure on a competitive firm’s costs of 
production.  Thus, the firm must innovatively reduce its overall cost 
structure to continue to earn economic profits.  Successful innovation 
drives a competitive firm’s cost structure down; with its cost curves 
shifting downward, it will again reap short-run, above-normal, economic 
profits.  Such profits will again attract market entry and, provided all of the 
underlying conditions of competition continue to hold, a new long-run 
equilibrium will once again be reached, reflecting lower market prices and 
zero economic profits. 
It is within this context that such a condition is “enormously 
powerful.”101  The perfectly-competitive model’s condition of zero long-
run economic profits nurtures its creative, innovative and progressiv
e. 
Competition may . . . impel firms to be efficient in seeking a new 
or improved products and new cost-saving production 
techniques.  With markets in equilibrium and prices just covering 
costs, such innovations would be the only way by which higher 
profits could be achieved . . . .  Whenever innovating effort takes 
resources and hence involves costs, the effort will not be made 
absent the prospect of an appropriate reward.  To the extent that 
innovations become quickly known and quickly copied by others 
without cost to them, competitive pricing will prevent the 
innovator from recovering its innovation costs.  Thus, it is 
probable that appropriate allocation of resources to innovative 
efforts requires at least lags in competitive response and perhaps 
even further guarantees or prospects of reward . . . .  [A]ntitrust 
policy must be appropriately concerned not only with rules that 
hinder innovation unnecessarily, but also with rules that are 
It is within this context that Adam Smith praised laissez faire political 
economies for their “great multiplication of the production of all the 
different arts . . . which occasions, in a well-governed society, that 
universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the 
 
in the market. 
 101. COLANDER, supra note 40 at 255; see also supra text accompanying note 98. 
 102. AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 35, at 7. 
 103. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 11 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, 1937) (1776) (“It is the great 
multiplication of the production of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of 
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institutional framework capable of cultivating “a well-governed society.” 
Thus, the institutional, governing framework of any laissez-faire based 
society must adopt and administer laws that nurture, promote and/or 
advance the fundamental tenets of the perfectly competitive economic 
model and all its underlying conditions. 
F.  Ceteris Paribus. 
The laws of the social sciences, including economics, are generalized 
statements of “social” or “economic tendencies;”104 they are statements that 
“a certain course of action may be expected under certain conditions.”105  It 
has been explained that the law of economics, as with every other science, 
“undertakes to study the effects which will be produced by certain causes, 
not absolutely, but subject to the condition that other things are equal, and 
that the causes are able to work out their effects undisturbed.”106 
Almost every scientific doctrine, when carefully and formally 
stated, will be found to contain some proviso to the effect that 
other things are equal:  the action of the causes in question is 
supposed to be isolated; certain effects are attributed to them, but 
only on the hypothesis that no cause is permitted to enter except 
those distinctly allowed for.107 
labor, which occasions, in a well-governed society, that universal opulence which extends 
itself to the lowest ranks of the people.  Every workman has a great quantity of his own 
work to dispose of beyond what he himself has occasion for; and every other workman 
being exactly in the same situation, he is enabled to exchange a great quantity of his own 
goods for a great quantity, or, what comes to the same thing, for the price of a great quantity 
of theirs.  He supplies them abundantly with what they have occasion for, and they 
accommodate him as amply with what he has occasion for, and a general plenty diffuses 
gates—or ’representative’ agents—which are linked to 
within an argument.  This 
itself through all the different ranks of society.”). 
 104. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 33 (8th ed., MacMillan and Co. 
1920) (1890) (discussing how laws are statements of social and economic tendencies); see 
also EKKEHART SCHLICHT, ISOLATION AND AGGREGATION IN ECONOMICS 1 (1985) 
(“[E]conomics is not concerned with the idiosyncrasies of particular cases, but looks for 
general rules linking typical incidents.  Usually these rules cannot be distilled stringently 
from the multitude of individual actions, and economics is bound, hence, to start from 
assumptions on behavior of aggre
individual actions just vaguely.”). 
 105. MARSHALL, supra note 104, at 87. 
 106. MARSHALL, supra note 104, at 36; see also SCHLICHT, supra note 104, at 3 
(“Economic data are not ultimate data, like the speed of light in physics.  Rather they are 
provisional in nature.  This is expressed by means of the ceteris paribus clause.  All factors 
not explicitly considered as variables are assumed to be fixed 
clause is used, explicitly or implicitly, throughout economics.”). 
 107. MARSHALL, supra note 104, at 36; see also SCHLICHT, supra note 104, at 1 
(“Economic phenomena are the outcomes of a plethora of factors, and economic analysis, 
unable to tackle them all, is compelled to select those factors which seem to be the most 
important, and to consider all other influences as data of the analysis.  But these data are 
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The Ceteris Paribus assumption (or condition), while one of the most 
important operational conditions of the perfectly-competitive model, is 
probably the one condition that is rarely addressed, likely to be taken for 
granted, and often ignored.  Ceteris Paribus is a qualifying assumption of a 
generalized law, generally asserting an axiomatic truth assuming “other 
things being equal.”108  Although its use as a qualifying economic 
assumption dates as far back as 1662,109 John Cairnes (in his 1857 work 
titled The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy) “is 
credited with enunciating the idea that the conclusions of economic 
investigations hold ‘only in the absence of disturbing causes.’”110  Alfred 
Marshall further popularized ceteris paribus as a qualifying economic 
assumption in his Principles of Economics published in 1890.111  Although 
ceteris paribus assumptions (or conditions) are critical to the application 
and operation of generalized conventional economic constructs, they are 
often cavalierly mentioned for the mere purpose of textural completeness 
by analysts and academics alike.  Whether classified as either a 
“comparative”112 or “exclusive”113 ceteris paribus assumption (or 
only provisional since they are wandering themselves.  One characteristic of economic 
)). 
chell eds. 2002) (providing general and historical discussion of 
ed its use as far back 
s
ing J. CAIRNES, THE 
); see also MARSHALL, supra note 104, at 
he presence of other ‘disturbing’ factors, but merely requires that they are kept 
analysis is, then, that it is built on a moving foundation.” (emphasis added
 108. Ceteris Paribus, MSN ENCARTA, http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/ 
refpages/search.aspx?q=ceteris+paribus (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) (defining ceteris paribus 
as “other things being equal.”); see also CETERUS PARIBUS LAWS (John Earman, Clark 
Glymour & Sandra Mit
ceteris paribus clauses). 
 109. See CETERUS PARIBUS LAWS, supra note 108, at 1 (citing J. Persky, Ceteris Paribus, 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 4, 187-93 (1990) as having trac
a  WILLIAM PETTY, TREATISE OF TAXES AND CONTRIBUTIONS (1662)). 
 110. See CETERUS PARIBUS LAWS, supra note 108, at 1 (cit
CHARACTER AND LOGICAL METHOD OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1857)). 
 111. See CETERUS PARIBUS LAWS, supra note 108, at 1 (citing ALFRED MARSHALL, 
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890)) (discussing how the classic example of a ceteris paribus 
law was made more pervasive by Marshall’s work
29-37 (considering the nature of economic laws). 
 112. See Gerhard Schurz, Ceteris Paribus Laws:  Classification and Deconstruction, 57 
ERKENNTNIS 351, 351-52 (2002) (“The comparative sense of CP-clauses derives from the 
literal meaning of ‘ceteris paribus’ as ‘the others being equal.’  A comparative CP-law 
makes an assertion about functional properties, henceforth called parameters.  It claims the 
increase (or decrease) of one parameter, say f(x), leads to an increase (or decrease) of 
another parameter, say g(x), provided that all other (unknown) parameters describing the 
states of the underlying system(s) remain the same.  Thus, a comparative CP-clause does 
not exclude t
constant.”). 
 113. See id. at 352 (“In the philosophical debate, however, CP-laws have usually been 
understood in the different exclusive sense.  An exclusive CP-law asserts that a certain state 
or event-type expressed by a (possibly complex) predicate Ax leads to another state or event-
type Cx provided disturbing influences are absent. Ax is called the antecedent and Cx the 
consequent predicate.  Thus an exclusive CP-clause does not merely require keeping all 
other causally interfering factors constant; it rather excludes the presence of causally 
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condition), ceteris paribus assumptions nonetheless have a robust 
significance with respect to the application of generalized economic laws 
and theories.  Accordingly, they should not be understated nor ignored. 
If all of the operational conditions of the perfectly-competitive model 
hold, then microeconomic theory instructs that the model’s efficiencies in 
consumption, production, and allocation will ultimately result to the favor 
of society, ceteris paribus (assuming all other things remain equal and/or 
the absence of all other disturbing influences).  To the extent social 
scientists and economists can identify and eliminate such disturbing 
influences, such influences remain equal and constant (in their absence).  
This article specifically addresses the ceteris paribus condition that all 
market participants are subject to the same geopolitical institutional rules, 
regulations and conventions.  To the extent that different rules, regulations, 
and conventions apply to competing participants within a single market, 
such differences will likely have an isolated and disturbing influence on the 
generalized laws of microeconomics discussed above. 
Consequently, in analyzing whether the hiring of an illegal alien 
worker (unauthorized by law to participate in a specific labor market) may 
jeopardize the efficiencies of perfect competition, it is important to 
acknowledge that the generalized laws of competitive efficiency constitute 
ceteris paribus laws; that is, they necessarily require that all other 
influences remain equal and/or the absence of all other disturbing 
influences.  The generalized economic laws of efficiency for which the 
perfectly-competitive model is highly touted will hold and inure to the 
benefit of society provided the regulations prohibiting illegal alien workers 
(or for that matter any other cohort of individuals) from participating in a 
specific labor market apply equally to all market participants (i.e., ceteris 
paribus).  Or alternatively stated, the extent that market rules and 
regulations are not equally applied to all market participants, the 
assumption (or condition) of ceteris paribus is violated; that is, the unequal 
application of laws and regulations relevant to the market will undoubtedly 
have disturbing influences on the generalized axioms of the perfectly-
competitive economic model. 
Drawing on prior research, this article will return to its discussion of 
the ceteris paribus assumption in following sections when specifically 
addressing whether the act of hiring illegal alien workers actually 
constitutes an unfair trade practice and/or restraint of trade resulting in a 
competitive injury. 
interfering factors.  In agreement with this exclusive understanding, [it has been] remarked 
that ‘the literal translation is ‘other things being equal’; but it would be more apt to read 
‘ceteris paribus’ as ‘other things being right.’”). 
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G.  Antitrust Injury. 
Antitrust injury is an “injury of the type the antitrust laws were 
intended to prevent.”114  It is regarded to be synonymous with “injury to 
competition,”115 and is frequently understood to reference the curtailment 
of output and higher prices.116  Proof of “antitrust injury” is now an 
essential element of proof in private antitrust actions under virtually all 
antitrust laws.117  And since the Supreme Court has previously held that 
“the antitrust laws . . . were enacted for the protection of competition,”118 
then it logically follows that the “injury should reflect the anticompetitive 
effect”119 resulting from a violation of the antitrust laws. 
It is from this perspective that the author of this article argues that 
microeconomics and its model of perfect competition proffer an analytical 
paradigm for assessing whether market conduct is likely to result in injury 
to competition, one of the essential prima facie elements of a federal 
antitrust cause of action. 
Instruction on the requisite antecedent conditions underlying the 
perfectly-competitive model not only dramatically simplifies the 
task of understanding antitrust precedent, but also provides an 
analytical framework for identifying anticompetitive conduct 
 114. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489  (1977); see also 
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 113 (1986) (reiterating its ruling in 
Brunswick that “a private plaintiff must allege threatened loss or damage ‘of the type the 
antitrust laws were designed to prevent.’”); Kevin S. Marshall, The Economics of 
Competitive Injury, 45 BRANDEIS L. J. 345, 345 [hereinafter Marshall, Competitive Injury] 
(quoting Supreme Court’s definition of antitrust injury in Brunswick). 
 115. Healow v. Anesthesia Partners, 92 F.3d 1192, 1996-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 71,567 (9th Cir., 
unpublished), cert. denied, 520 U.S.  1117 (1996) (holding that there was no antitrust injury 
because the underlying market structure did not support any inference of “injury to 
competition”). 
 116. See Sanderson v. Culligan Int’l Co., 415 F. 3d. 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that 
antitrust law “condemns practices that drive up prices by curtailing output”); see also, 
NCAA v. Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103-07 (1984) (finding that because the NCAA’s 
television plan restrained prices and output it had an anticompetitive effect); Broadcast 
Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441  U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (stating that court’s must examine 
whether the effect of a practice is to decrease output and restrict competition); William H. 
Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust:  Characterization, Antitrust 
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1268-71 & 1272 n. 253 (1989) 
(analyzing legal history of antitrust injury doctrine and finding that most appropriate 
standard for causation in antitrust injury is whether size of injury that plaintiff claims is in 
direct proportion to the restriction in output alleged by the practice). 
 117. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE 605 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing the elements of antitrust injury that a plaintiff 
must show to recover). 
 118. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 
294, 320 (1962)). 
 119. Id. at 489. 
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independent of precedential constraint.  Once the requisite 
antecedent conditions for competition to thrive are identified and 
understood, the jurist, the antitrust practitioner, and the economic 
analyst are in a superior position from which to analyze 
anticompetitive conduct that may trigger statutory liability.120 
If the above conditions must be met [in order] for the perfectly 
competitive market to thrive, then from a purely economic perspective, it 
follows that any market conduct or activity that impairs, threatens, 
suppresses or jeopardizes any one or more of such underlying conditions 
must be discouraged as a matter of public policy.  It is in this context that 
the [referenced] underlying conditions provide a powerful analytical 
paradigm for identifying market conduct or activity that may likely 
constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade, an unfair method of 
competition, and a competitive injury.121 
In the following section, it is demonstrated that a firm that hires an 
illegal alien worker at below-market wages generates several 
anticompetitive effects.  Such conduct directly and negatively impacts 
several of the operational conditions of perfect competition, thereby 
obstructing its ability to create the efficiencies for which it is universally 
regarded. 
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF HIRING ILLEGAL ALIEN WORKERS 
While graduate students of business are routinely taught to search for 
“favorable competitive position[s] and durable above-normal profits,”122 
public policy, nonetheless, proscribes the use of “anticompetitive” conduct 
for such purposes.123  To reiterate, 
 120. Kevin S. Marshall, Product Disparagement Under the Sherman Act, Its Nurturing 
and Injurious Effects to Competition, and the Tension Between Jurisprudential Economics 
and Microeconomics, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 231, 235-36 (2006) [hereinafter Marshall, 
Product Disparagement]; see also Marshall, Competitive Injury, supra note 114, at 351 
(2007) (quoting same). 
 121. Marshall, Product Disparagement, supra note 120, at 238 (emphasis added); see 
also Marshall, Competitive Injury, supra note 114, at 354 (quoting same). 
 122. HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 404. 
 123. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 47 
(1978) (referencing the passage of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts).  Bork 
observes that “some economic practices are particularly suspect, somehow not normal, 
because they provide means, other than superior efficiency, by which a firm may gain or 
keep a monopoly position.  But this notion, whose dangers have already been sketched, 
attained new potency because it was coupled with a second idea, the concept of incipiency.  
To recapitulate briefly, this consists of the theory that the anticompetitive potential of 
suspect practices may be discerned, and the practices stopped, well before they have actual 
anticompetitive consequences.”) Id.; see also HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 534 (“Antitrust 
policy in the United States is designed to protect competition . . . .  In a vigorously 
competitive economic environment, there will be corporate winners and losers.  This is fine 
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In [long-run] equilibrium, perfectly competitive markets only 
offer the potential for a normal rate of return on investment.  If 
many capable competitors offer identical products, vigorous price 
competition tends to eliminate disequilibrium profits.  The only 
exception to this rule is superior efficiency can sometimes lead to 
superior profits, even in perfectly competitive markets.  Above-
normal profits in perfectly competitive industries are usually 
transitory and reflect the influences of economic rents, luck, or 
disequilibrium conditions.  If above-normal returns persist for 
extended periods in a given industry or line of business, elements 
of uniqueness are probably at work.124 
To the extent that a competitor achieves above-normal returns, in 
defiance of the perfectly-competitive model’s condition of long-run zero 
economic profits, suggests either (1) continued entrepreneurial innovation 
and enhanced efficiencies in production, or (2) an otherwise suspect 
imperfectly competitive market driven by unique conditions.  In the case of 
sustained above-normal profits resulting from the hiring of illegal alien 
workers, such above-normal profits are driven by distorted, below-market 
labor costs.  Such below-market labor costs ultimately create single-firm 
market power sufficient to jeopardize and threaten several of the perfectly-
competitive model’s underlying conditions, i.e., the model’s necessary 
conditions of price-taking participants, no entry or exit barriers, fully 
informed buyers and sellers, and ceteris paribus are all at risk by a firm’s 
unlawful hiring of illegal alien workers, provided such conduct is driven by 
the firm’s realization of below-market labor costs. 
so long as the game is played fairly.  When unfair methods of competition emerge, antitrust 
policy is brought to bear.”). 
 124. HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 404. 
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A. Perfect Competition and the Price-Taking Firm with Long-Run Zero 
Economic Profits. 
 
PERFECT COMPETITION & THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM 
WITH LONG-RUN ZERO ECONOMIC PROFITS 
Firm in Competition 
Market Supply and Demand 
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Figure 6 
 
 
If the firm decides to seek above-normal profits (i.e., economic 
profits) by engaging in the unlawful hiring of illegal alien workers at a 
below-market wage rate, such conduct will artificially drive the firm’s 
entire cost structure downward, with its marginal cost, average total cost, 
and average variable cost curves all shifting downward, allowing it to again 
realize above-normal economic profits.  The firm’s lower cost structure, 
however, is not the result of entrepreneurial innovation characterized by 
Figure 6 above illustrates a rational (profit-maximizing), price-taking 
firm in long-run equilibrium experiencing zero economic profits.  At 
market price Pe = PC (competitive price charged by firm), firm will produce 
quantity QS, where the market price line, the firm’s marginal revenue (MR) 
curve and its perceived horizontal demand curve (dth) intersect its long-run 
marginal cost curve (LMC) at the minimum point of its long-run average 
total cost curve (LATC).  Given that all of the previously discussed 
underlying conditions of perfect competition hold, the market will produce 
quantity Qe units at a market clearing price of Pe.  At PeQe, the market 
minimizes, if not eliminates, waste in an economic environment of scarcity. 
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inventiveness, ingenuity, or resourcefulness.  Rather, the firm’s lower cost 
structure is realized by the unlawful activity of hiring illegal alien workers 
at below-market wage rates.  The lower cost structure is the result of the 
intentional violation of the ceteris paribus condition of the perfectly-
competitive model.  This lower cost structure is the disturbing influence on 
the model’s generalized efficiencies caused by a firm’s willingness to 
leverage the unequal economic playing field created by its anticompetitive 
and unlawful conduct. 
B. Predation and the Violation of Ceteris Paribus. 
PREDATION AND THE VIOLATION OF CERTERIS PARIBUS 
(DISTORTING MARKET INPUT COSTS) 
Predatory Firm  
(Distorting Input Costs by Hiring Illegal 
Alien Workers) Market Supply and Demand 
QS 
PC 
 
D
S = ΣSMCith
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firm
LATC′
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′
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Qe QS' 
PP* 
PP 
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Figure 7 
 
Figure 7 above illustrates the downward shift in the firm’s entire cost 
structure realized by its hiring of illegal alien workers at below-market 
wage rates.  As a result of its unlawful conduct, its long-run marginal cost, 
average total cost, and average variable cost curves shift to LMC', LATC', 
and LAVC' respectively.  As a rational profit-maximizer, the firm’s output 
will increase from QS to QS' should it decide to continue to sell its output at 
the market price of Pe = PC, allowing it potential above-normal profits equal 
to the area of rectangle PCABPP*.  The firm’s increased output will likely 
have an impact on the market price to the extent it causes total supply to 
shift to the right.  To the extent that market output exceeds and is to the 
  
2008] ILLEGAL ALIEN WORKERS 83 
 
right of Qe, the “but for” equilibrium quantity (but for the firm’s unlawful 
hiring of illegal alien workers), such output will be a distortion of the 
supply and demand forces, resulting in economic waste.  More will be 
produced than the forces of supply and demand would otherwise dictate, 
and resources will no longer be driven to their highest valued uses.  
Furthermore, to the extent market price declines ever so slightly as a result 
of the firm’s increase in output, other market competitors (who refuse to 
breach the condition of ceteris paribus by engaging in similar unlawful 
conduct), who otherwise would be experiencing a long-run equilibrium of 
zero economic profits, will now likely be facing losses at the margins. 
C. Market Power and Sustained, Long-Run Above Normal Profits. 
Anticompetitive/Predatory Firm Market Supply and Demand 
QS'
PC 
 
D
S = ΣMCith
MC = Sith firm 
ATC 
AVC 
dith= MR =Pe 
Qe 
PP* 
PP 
Figure  8 
MARKET POWER  & SUSTAINED, LONG-RUN ABOVE NORMAL PROFITS 
 
As discussed earlier in this paper,125 “it is the revenue obtained from 
selling one more unit of output that is relevant to the profit-maximizing 
firm’s output decision.  If the firm can sell all it wishes without having any 
effect on price, the market price will indeed be the extra revenue obtained 
from selling one more unit.”126  In perfect competition, a rational, profit-
maximizing firm will fix its output where its marginal cost equals its 
 125. See supra Part III(E), and specifically notes 68, 76-80 and accompanying text. 
  126. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 60, at 251. 
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marginal revenue, which is equal to the market price (MR = MC = Pe).  In 
perfect competition, firms are consequently price-takers; they each produce 
such a negligible amount of the total market supply that none are capable of 
affecting price by the amount they choose to produce. 
Figure 8 above illustrates the newly created market power127 realized 
from the firm’s artificially lowered cost structure, resulting from its 
unlawful hiring of illegal alien workers at below-market wage rates.  The 
market price (as determined by the unfettered forces of supply and demand) 
equals Pe.  However, because of the firm’s newly lowered cost structure (as 
reflected by the MC, ATC and AVC curves in Figure 8), the firm now has 
the power to increase its output by setting its price somewhere between PC 
= Pe and PP.128 
 127. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 328 (“[M]arket power:  the ability—
of either a seller or a buyer—to affect the price of a good.”); see also ABA SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK:  COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMIC 
FOUNDATIONS 5 (2005) (“The economic concept of market power is central to the legal 
analysis of most antitrust cases.  Like economists, courts have used the term ‘market power’ 
to describe situations in which a firm or group of firms have control over price and 
output.”); 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 291, ¶2211c (2nd ed. 2005) (“While courts sometimes 
define ‘market power’ as involving either the power to raise price above cost or else the 
power to exclude . . . .”). 
 128. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 60, at 252 (“A firm may not 
always be able to sell all it wants at the prevailing market price, however.  If it faces a 
downward-sloping demand curve for its product, more output can be sold only by reducing 
the good’s price.  In this case the revenue obtained from selling one more unit will be less 
than the price of that unit because, in order to get more consumers to take the extra unit, the 
price of all other units must be lowered.”). 
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D. Predation, Market Power, Arbitrary Market Exit and Barriers to 
Entry. 
PREDATION AND MARKET EXIT
FIRM A 
(with Distorted Predatory Input Costs) 
FIRM B 
(with Long-run Zero Economic Profits) 
Pe 
PP' 
 
MC = Sith firm 
ATC 
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To the 
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A sets its 
price at PP < 
PC, Firm B 
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and exits. 
PP* 
PP 
Figure 9 
Qe 
 
Figure 9 above further illustrates Firm A’s newly created market 
power as defined by its ability to set price between the otherwise given 
market price of Pe = PC and PP while continuing to earn above-normal 
economic profits.  In the absence of Firm A’s unlawful conduct of 
employing illegal alien workers at below-market wage rates, Firm B will 
experience long-run zero economic profits, or rather, normal-profits.  Firm 
A, however, can prey on Firm B and others similarly situated in the market 
by wielding its market power by setting price below the otherwise given 
market price, and thus, setting price below Firm B’s average total cost 
curve at PP'.  In such a situation, Firm B has no choice but to meet Firm A’s 
price of PP', especially since Firm B is a price-taker by definition (unless, of 
course, Firm B also chooses to unlawfully employ illegal alien workers at 
below-market wage rates.).  At a price equal to PP', while Firm A will 
nonetheless realize above-normal economic profits, Firm B will not.  Since 
price PP' is less than Firm B’s average total costs, Firm B will only 
minimize its losses at a price equal to PP'.  Consequently, at price PP', Firm 
B should consider exiting the market.  Given the presence of fixed costs, 
the firm’s average variable costs are less than its average total cost, and the 
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“firm is indeed losing money.”129 
The fact that Firm A’s lowered cost structure driven by its decision to 
unlawfully hire illegal alien workers at below-market rates rather than 
some transient market condition suggests that Firm B will continue to 
sustain losses at price PP'.  Thus, there is little reason for Firm B to remain 
in the market and await a new long-run equilibrium where it will again earn 
normal profits on its capital investment.  Firm B’s options are to either exit 
the market or adopt Firm A’s unlawful conduct and thereby level the 
economic playing field. 
At prices PP* and PP, there is little doubt that Firm B must exit the 
market.  Prices PP* and PP are less than Firm B’s average variable costs (PP* 
and PP < AVC).  Again, Firm B has little choice but to exit the market or 
adopt Firm A’s unlawful conduct of hiring illegal alien workers at below-
market costs.130 
Firm A’s lowered but distorted input costs realized by its efforts to 
unlawfully employ illegal alien workers at below-market wage rates, at a 
minimum, discourage future market entry, and more realistically are likely 
to constitute formidable, if not impenetrable, barriers to market entry. 
 129. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 259 (“The firm should therefore consider 
shutting down.  If it does, it earns no revenue, but it avoids the fixed as well as the variable 
cost of production.”); see also HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 389 (“Under perfect 
competition, the firm will either produce nothing and incur a loss equal to its fixed costs, or 
it will produce an output determined by the intersection of the horizontal demand curve and 
the marginal cost curve.  If price is less than average variable costs, the firm should produce 
nothing and incur a loss equal to total fixed costs.  Losses will increase if any output is 
produced and sold when P < AVC.  If price exceeds average variable cost, then each unit of 
output provides at least some profit contribution to help cover fixed costs and provide profit.  
The minimum point on the firm’s average variable cost curve determines the lower limit, or 
cutoff point, of its supply schedule.”); SALVATORE, supra note 93, at 331 (“Another way of 
looking at this is to say that . . . the excess of [price] . . . over the firm’s average variable 
cost (AVC) . . . can be applied to cover part of the firm’s fixed costs . . . .  Thus, the firm 
minimizes its losses by continuing to produce its best level of output.”). 
 130. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 259-60; see also COLANDER, supra note 
40, at 259 (“The shutdown price for a perfectly competitive firm is a price below the 
minimum point of the average variable cost curve.”); HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 390 
(“Price fails to cover variable costs at price below . . . the minimum point of the AVC curve, 
so this is the lowest price at which the firm will operate.”); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 
52, at 316-17 (“A price-taking firm maximizes economic profits (or minimizes losses) in the 
short run by producing the output for which marginal cost equals price unless the price is 
lower than the minimum of its average variable-cost curve.  In that case, the market price is 
lower than the average variable cost of producing any and all levels of output, so the firm 
will minimize losses by discontinuing production.”); NICHOLSON, supra note 60, at 271 (“If 
price falls below minimum AVC, the firm’s profit maximizing choice is to shut down and 
produce nothing.”); SALVATORE, supra note 93, at 331 (“Thus, point H is the shut-down 
point of the firm.  Below point H, the firm would not even cover its variable costs, and so by 
going out of business, the firm would limit its losses to be equal to its total fixed costs.”). 
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E.  The Anticompetitive/Unfair Competitive Nature of an Asymmetrical 
Geopolitical Landscape. 
From a purely economic perspective, the unlawful act of hiring illegal 
alien workers at below-market wage rates at a very minimum discourages, 
if not eliminates competition.  Moreover, to the extent such conduct 
ultimately leads to the failure of several operational conditions necessary 
for competition to thrive, such conduct results in a competitive injury to the 
market place, and ultimately society. 
First, such conduct threatens, jeopardizes, and/or impedes several 
underlying conditions of the perfectly-competitive model.  It violates the 
assumption that all buyers and sellers are price–takers, giving the hiring 
firm significant market power.  It creates an environment of exclusion 
nurtured by the creation of entry and exit barriers at both the input and 
output levels of competition.  It generates distorted output levels driven by 
inaccurate below-market cost data.  And finally, it violates the ceteris 
paribus assumption to the extent that market competitors seek profit-
maximization within a very unstable, asymmetrical geopolitical 
infrastructure where different rules apply to different participants, due to 
both the failure to adhere to statutory proscription and of the sovereignty to 
enforce breaches thereof. 
Second, the conduct of hiring illegal alien workers at below-market 
wage rates attacks and vitiates the central nervous system of the perfectly-
competitive model, and accordingly, will likely lead to exclusion, higher 
prices and curtailed output.  Once a firm realizes artificial below-market 
costs from its unlawful activities, there is little its competitors can do but to 
either exit the market or join in the unlawful activity. 
Finally, for competition to thrive, the geopolitical playing field must 
be level for all participants.  There is simply no pro-competitive business 
justification for ignoring the geopolitical landscape upon which economic 
battles are won or lost.  The rules must be equally applied to all economic 
combatants; otherwise, an asymmetrical application of the rules of the 
competitive market place will annihilate the natural utility/profit 
maximizing incentives that drive the economy. 
V.  RELEVANT JURISPRUDENTIAL ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST 
PRECEDENT. 
A. Sherman Antitrust Act §1 and Unlawful Restraints in Trade. 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states that “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
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declared to be illegal.”131  Of course, common law precedent qualifies 
Section 1 by explaining that only concerted activity that results in an 
“unreasonable” restraint of trade is actionable under the Sherman Act.132  
Although it is a vertical agreement/combination between a firm and its 
unlawful labor force that is at issue, such an agreement/combination 
nonetheless constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade to the extent that 
it interferes with the unfettered forces of supply and demand as it 
determines an equilibrium quantity and a market clearing price.  Moreover, 
such an agreement/combination further constitutes an unreasonable 
restraint of trade to the extent that it restrains other horizontal competitors 
from entering and/or otherwise causes them to arbitrarily and hastily exit 
the market.  Finally, the unreasonableness of the act is certainly grounded 
on its unlawfulness; its illegality is counterintuitive to notions of 
reasonableness. 
B. Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, Attempts to Monopolize and Predation. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states that “[e]very person who 
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with 
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony.”133  The act of unlawfully hiring illegal alien 
workers at below-market wage rates is clearly predatory; and to the extent 
that it has a probability of succeeding in driving competitors out of, as well 
as barring other would-be competitors from entering the market, such an 
act is unlawful under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
Although antitrust law is not usually concerned with setting a 
limit on price competition, under certain conditions low prices 
may have anticompetitive effects.  A firm that drives out, 
excludes, or disciplines rivals by selling at non-remunerative 
prices is not competing on the merits, but engaging in behavior 
that may properly be called predatory.  Antitrust therefore 
includes a “predatory pricing” offense within the proscription of 
 131. 15 U.S.C. §1 (2004). 
 132. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (revealing 
that under this view, the purpose of the statute is not to restrain the right to make and 
enforce contracts, whether resulting from combinations or otherwise, which did not unduly 
restrain interstate or foreign commerce; but to protect that commerce from being restrained 
by methods  whether old or new, which would constitute an interference, and thus would 
qualify as an undue restraint); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 
127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2007) (“[T]he Court has repeated time and again that § 1 ‘outlaws 
only unreasonable restraints.’”) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)). 
 133. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004). 
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monopolization in §2 of the Sherman Act . . . .134 
 
If a firm (taking advantage of its distorted cost structure resulting from 
its unlawful hiring activities) attempts to exclude its rivals by pricing below 
the otherwise long-run, market-average total costs confronting its law-
abiding rivals, it is fair to say that its behavior is predatory.135 
In many ways, the case of a firm hiring illegal alien workers at below-
market wages and proceeding to price its product below its otherwise 
would-be average total cost curve is analogous (but without the sacrifice of 
short-run profits) to the predatory pricing cases reviewed in most Antitrust 
textbooks.  The practice of predatory pricing has been classically described 
to involve 
an immediate sacrifice of profits through unreasonably low 
prices.  These low prices destroy rivals or intimidate them from 
selling at a lower price than the defendant charges.  Then follows 
a “recoupment” period, during which the defendant enjoys 
monopoly prices or profits.  In order for predatory pricing of this 
variety to be rational strategy, recoupment gains, discounted to 
present value, must exceed the immediate losses from the 
predatory campaign.136 
Contrary to the classic predatory pricing case, profit is not sacrificed 
in the short-run when a firm unlawfully hires illegal alien workers at 
below-market wages and proceeds to price its product below its otherwise 
would-be average total cost curve.  Throughout the firm’s campaign of 
predation, it has the capacity to earn above-normal economic profits.  The 
issue of whether the firm will likely recoup the expenses of its predatory 
conduct is therefore moot.  There is little or no danger of failure; rather, 
there is a dangerous probability that the firm will succeed with respect to its 
exclusionary intent. 
 
 134. PHILLIP E. AREEDA AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW 
§7.03a,7-41 (3d ed. 2008). 
 135. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (“If a 
firm has been ‘attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,’ it is fair to 
characterize its behavior as predatory.” (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 
160 (1978)); see also 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 78 (1978) 
(“Thus, ‘exclusionary’ comprehends at the most behavior that not only (1) tends to impair 
the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or 
does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.”). 
 136. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3A ANTITRUST LAW, AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 22 (3d ed. 2008). 
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C.  Per Se Unlawfulness. 
The predatory conduct of unlawfully hiring illegal alien workers at 
below-market wage rates is per se unlawful.  The Supreme Court has 
resorted to per se rules when the restraint being analyzed “would always or 
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”137  For a 
particular restraint or activity to justify per se treatment, the restraint or 
activity must have “manifestly anticompetitive” effects138 and “lack . . . any 
redeeming virtue.”139  The predatory act of unlawfully hiring illegal alien 
workers at below-market wage rates is manifestly anticompetitive for all of 
the reasons discussed above.  Moreover, one is hard pressed to find any 
redeeming virtue in a predatory activity, which is statutorily unlawful. 
D.  Unfair Methods of Competition—The California Model. 
In closing, it merits noting that the California Unfair Competition 
Law140 (which is often considered analogous to the Federal Trade 
Commission Act141) defines the term “unfair competition” to include “any 
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice . . . .”142  Essentially, 
under California law, any unlawful business act may constitute a method of 
unfair competition.  Accordingly, any unlawful business act is 
independently actionable under the California Business and Professions 
Code.143  As one California Appellate Court explained, “[t]he ‘unlawful’ 
 137. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 127 S. Ct. at 2713 (2007) (quoting Business Elec. 
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723(1988)). 
 138. Id. (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977)). 
 139. Id. (quoting Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 
472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985)). 
 140. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008). 
 141. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 33 at 6:3 (“The UCL is 
California’s ‘little FTC Act.’”). 
 142. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, supra note 140 (stating “[a]s used in this chapter, 
unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or 
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by 
Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and 
Professions Code.”). 
 143. Id.; see also Rubin v. Green, 847 P.2d 1044 (Cal. 1993) (deciding UCL action 
based on unlawful client solicitation); People v. McKale, 602 P.2d 731 (Cal. 1979) 
(deciding UCL action based on violation of Mobilehome Park Act); Fenning v. Glenfed, 47 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (deciding UCL action based on fraudulent and 
negligent misrepresentations concerning federal insurance of investment products); 
Saunders v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 440-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that 
unlawful business practices prohibited by § 17200 are any practices forbidden by any law, 
regardless if the predicate law provides for private enforcement); Consumer Union of U. S., 
Inc. v. Fisher Dev., Inc., 257 Cal. Rptr. 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (deciding UCL action to 
enforce Unruh Civil Rights Act). 
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practices prohibited by section 17200 are any practices forbidden by law, 
be it civil or criminal, federal, state or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or 
court-made.”144 
For example, in the California case, Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. 
Lucky Stores, Inc.,145 a non-profit organization brought suit under 
California’s Unfair Competition Law against the Defendant and numerous 
other retailers in Northern California for selling cigarettes to minor children 
in violation of the state’s penal code.  In reversing the trial court’s order 
sustaining the defendant retailer’s demurrer, the California Court of 
Appeals observed that: 
Approximately 90 percent of cigarette sales in northern 
California are to children or to adults who were addicted as 
children and who would like, but are unable, to quit smoking.  
Consequently, [Defendant] has unjustly enriched itself in an 
amount equal to 90 percent of its gross profits from the sale of 
cigarettes.146 
In reaching its decision, the court noted that: 
The UCL [Unfair Competition Law] defines “unfair competition” 
as “. . . any unlawful, unfair or deceptive, untrue or misleading 
advertising . . . .”  As we recently explained in reviewing the 
scope and purpose of the unfair competition law and its remedial 
provisions, “[t]he Legislature intended this ‘sweeping language’ 
to include ‘anything that can properly be called a business 
practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.’”147 
The broad reach of the California statute accommodates the ceteris 
paribus condition of the perfectly-competitive model to the extent that it 
nurtures a level playing field for all market competitors and proscribes as a 
matter of law any and all disturbing influences resulting from the 
engagement of an unlawful act for the purpose of gaining an advantage in 
the market place.  Under such a model, the unlawful act of hiring illegal 
alien workers at below-market rates unequivocally constitutes an unfair 
method of competition. 
 
 144. Saunders, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441. 
 145. 950 P.2d 1086 (Cal. 1998). 
 146. Id. at 1089. 
 147. Id. at 1090, (citing Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal..4th 1254, 1266 (Cal. 
1992)) (internal citation omitted). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The central issue addressed by this article is whether the hiring of 
illegal alien workers at below-market wage rates may constitute an unfair 
trade and/or anticompetitive practice with exclusionary effects.  It is 
important to understand that the unfair/anticompetitive nature of the 
referenced act is driven by a below-market wage rate that is often realized 
because of the illegal nature of the employment relationship.  Although 
certainly suspect, transactions involving the employment of illegal alien 
workers may not rise to the level of anticompetitive conduct if such 
employment is at or above market wage rates.  However, when such 
employment is effectuated at below-market rates, rates regulated by state or 
federal minimum wage laws, or rates that are otherwise uniquely available 
in black-market circumstances, such employment practices are predatory 
and have little redeeming values. 
It might be suggested that the anticompetitive nature of the referenced 
employment practice is a function of whether firms engaged in such 
practices will likely be subjected to fines or other penalties as mandated by 
U.S. immigration laws.  One might argue that the extent to which a firm is 
likely to face enforcement penalties due to its hiring of illegal workers, 
such penalties will push the firm to raise its input costs back to competitive 
market levels.  Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that such 
employment practices will have a high probability of success in terms of 
causing any exclusionary effects.  The critical question, however, is not 
whether the government has enforced immigration laws by way of fine or 
sanction, but whether the hiring of illegal alien workers has allowed a firm 
to reduce its costs to the exclusion of its law-abiding competitors 
(regardless of the government’s enforcement activities).  If there is little or 
no enforcement of the law prohibiting the hiring of illegal alien workers 
such that a firm is willing to take the risk of hiring such workers, then the 
firm’s employment practice is anticompetitive and market distorting insofar 
as it results in such workers being hired at below-market wages.  If it does 
not lead to such workers being hired at below-market wages, then there is 
no anticompetitive advantage gained by such a practice. 
On the other hand, even if there is aggressive enforcement of the law 
prohibiting the hiring of illegal alien workers, such enforcement does not 
operate as a guarantee to remedy the anticompetitive nature of the 
employment act, unless such enforcement has the effect of raising the 
firm’s costs back to competitive market levels.  Thus, the economic 
question is whether the act of hiring illegal alien workers allows a firm to 
artificially reduce its cost structure to the exclusion of the other law-abiding 
firms who refuse to violate the law, regardless of existing enforcement 
policies.  Additionally, given the lagged effect of any regulatory 
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intervention in an otherwise failed competitive market place, such 
intervention may be too little, too late; especially if the injury to the 
competitive market place has already resulted in the artificially premature 
exit of competitive firms. 
Collateral but related issues raised by the above analysis meriting 
further consideration include: 
 
(1) Will a private cause of action under state or federal 
antitrust laws for the hiring of an illegal alien worker 
ultimately facilitate the enforcement of U.S. 
immigration laws?  If so, what are the policy 
implications with respect to same?  Will such private 
causes of action serve the public interest from a private 
attorney general perspective? 
 
(2) Will the United States’ immigration law’s penalty and 
sanction provisions merit review to the extent they 
merely reference arbitrary penalty amounts?  Given the 
potentially anticompetitive effect resulting from a 
firm’s violation of United States’ immigration law, 
should Congress at least consider amending the 
penalty provisions of such laws and allow for the 
imposition of penalties and sanctions equal to the 
anticompetitive injury inflicted on the relevant market 
under examination? 
 
(3) Does the probability of enforcement impact the 
strategic games competitors play within various market 
structures such as perfect competition, monopolistic 
competition, oligopoly, duopoly, and/or monopoly? 
 
(4) Will the certeris paribus assumption (or condition) 
play an important role in other policy scenarios such as 
constitutional notions of equal protection, deterrence 
of other antisocial conduct, and/or institutional 
legitimacy of public enforcement strategies? 
 
In closing, the hiring of illegal alien workers at below-market wages 
may indeed constitute an unlawful restraint of trade and/or unfair trade 
practice under both state and federal law.  Enforcement of the statutory 
prohibitions against the hiring of illegal alien workers, whether by criminal 
prosecutions under the United States immigration laws or by civil (or 
criminal) prosecutions under state and federal antitrust laws, is critical to 
correcting and/or minimizing the accompanying economic distortions and 
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inefficiencies that are generated by such hiring practices. 
